

JOHN R. REITEMEYER

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JOHN R. REITEMEYER

November 13, 1974

Lt. Gen. Vernon L. Walters
Deputy Director
CIA
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear General Walters:

It is 30 odd years since you and I shepherded General Dutra around New York in what for me at least was an extremely trying assignment. Police outriders with the Brazilian flag, a special Minister of War license plate for the car in which he was to ride, insistent that he take precedence over General Grunert and have the right hand seat in the car which carried him from Governor's Island down to the Officers Club. I suppose it might have been even more complicated if I had arranged to get women for the visiting staff. I suppose you know that Dutra died either last year or the year before.

I am writing to you at this time because the President has been requested to turn over to the Inter American Press Association, the names of newspapers and others who are alleged to have received subsidies of some kind from the CIA. I am a former President of the Inter American Press Association and prior to becoming a President, I was for seven years Chairman of the Executive Committee. This job, I suppose, has taken me almost to every country in Latin America. On the other hand, I am a former chicken colonel of the Military Intelligence Division. In this instance, I feel my Intelligence experience takes precedence over my affiliation with the Inter American Press Association.

I think it is ridiculous to publish a list of newspapers or agencies in Chili, or elsewhere for that matter, who received aid of any kind from the CIA. As a matter of fact, I think the writings of former CIA agents and others goes far beyond what I consider to be permissible bounds. In my opinion,

details of intelligence operations whether covert or otherwise should not be shouted out to the world.

I am enclosing an article which appeared in the London Daily Telegraph on Friday, November 1. In my opinion, the Daily Telegraph is today the best newspaper in Britain. This article reflects my own views. Perhaps it would do no harm to show it to the President or to anyone else who might be eager to disclose information which, in my opinion, should not be disclosed.


I was in Santiago, Chili, about six months before the revolution. Among other things, one night I had dinner with a man who is the leader of the extreme right party, which, at that time, had made a marriage of convenience with the Christian Democrats. It was apparent to me that things had come to such a pass in Chili that there would have been a revolution and an attempt to depose Allende even if the CIA had been in no way involved.

I don't know whether you know that General Adams who was with the Brazilian party, at that time our Military Attache in Brazil, wanted me to go to Brazil as Assistant Attache. He painted a very glowing picture of this job but the last thing I wanted was to go to Brazil as an Assistant Attache. I told General Adams that I did not think General Grunert would release me. He informed me that he had been General Marshall's Aide and that he could spring me loose regardless of General Grunert's feelings. However, shortly after he returned to Brazil, Adams became seriously ill and was compelled to retire from the Army. That ended that episode.

I was interested to see a two column cut of you in the Courant the other day in connection with your testimony at the Watergate trial. This whole Watergate affair is one of the craziest operations I have ever known. I cannot understand how anyone with any intelligence experience could have handled this break-in in such a clumsy fashion.

With best wishes, I remain

Sincerely,



ROBERT MOSS on the implications of America's 'passion for disclosure'

THE fuss about CIA involvement in Chile has died down for the moment in Washington, but the chances are that, when Dr Kissinger returns from his present journeyings, he will find the issue still there to haunt him. Gen. Andropov, chief of the KGB, must be convulsed with laughter at the sight of so many American Senators and newspaper editors protesting that their country has no right to pursue any sort of covert foreign policy.

President Ford said the obvious when, in his attempt to justify the fact that the CIA spent \$6 million to support opposition parties and media under President Allende, he pointed out that the Russians were spending considerably more on such operations and tend to conduct them far more ruthlessly. It is only necessary to glance back over the past few years to see that the Russians have made a tremendous investment in intelligence activities in the effort to depose non-Communist régimes. Even in Latin America, which has always ranked low on their order of priorities, the Russians have been doing some very curious things.

In March, 1971, the Mexicans expelled five KGB officers, who had been masquerading as Soviet diplomats, because they had helped to finance and organise a guerrilla group called the Revolutionary Action Movement. A few months later, Ecuador expelled another three Russian officials for their role in funding the Marxist-dominated Confederation of Ecuatorian Workers which had used the money to organise a general strike originally planned to co-ordinate with a Left-wing coup.

In Chile, Russia's hand was obvious again, although, as in many similar cases, the Cuban intelligence organisation, the DGI, served as Moscow's in-

Chile, the CIA and the Communists

strument. The DGI has now been completely colonised by the KGB and operates under the close surveillance of a KGB general in Havana. A DGI officer, Luis Fernández de Oña, occupied an office next to Allende's, reading his correspondence and screening his visitors. There was, it is true, a personal factor involved: he became Allende's son-in-law by marrying his daughter, "Tati," but it was more than a family affair.

The continuing inquest into the Chile affair is part of the malign legacy of Watergate and the Vietnam war. Both undermined the confidence of many Americans in the integrity of the Administration and have created an enormous bandwagon in favour of public supervision of every aspect of policy-making. They also created a passion for disclosure that now makes it impossible for anyone to assume that confidential information will be kept confidential.

One of the most dangerous aspects of the Chile affair is the way that the names of political parties, newspapers and radio stations and trade union organisations that are alleged to have received CIA funds have been bandied about.

If public hearings go further, the next step, no doubt, would be the naming of Chileans alleged to have had some relationship with the American Government. This would be a list of the terrorist organisations that have espoused the cause of "Allende the Martyr";

it would discourage people in other situations who might contemplate turning to the Americans, rather than Russians, for outside support.

The limits of the CIA involvement in Chile have been muddled beyond recognition. During the first months of Allende's government, before it became apparent that the Marxists in it were bent on a total seizure of power, the Americans experimented with a policy of conciliation. This was largely the work of Ambassador Korry, who, for example, tried to negotiate with Allende over the nationalisation of major American interests, such as the big copper companies. He actually offered Allende a deal that would have enabled the Chilean Government to pay compensation with official bonds underwritten by the American Treasury. The deal, however, was rejected by Allende after it was vetoed by the leader of the extremist wing of the Socialist party, Carlos Allamirano.

It was not the CIA funds that finally brought about the coup d'état in September last year. At best, they served to keep in being a number of newspapers that would otherwise have collapsed as a result of spiralling costs, declining advertising and frozen prices. Without that critical voice, and without the major strikes, also partly financed by the Americans, the spread hostility to the régime, the Marxists in Chile would have found their road to power

much less stony. It was not in the power of the Americans, however, to bring together the broad range of political forces that united to topple the régime. A cynic might even say that the conclusive proof that the coup was not essentially the work of the CIA was that it worked so smoothly.

Perhaps it is not good enough for Americans, or America's allies, to conclude that what "our" side does is justified because the "other" side is doing the same, or worse. But when it is seriously proposed, as in two recent books on the CIA, that covert operations should never be licensed, it has to be pointed out that this would leave a tremendous vacuum in many areas the Communists would not be slow to exploit. The things that were done in Chile would have provoked little comment if they had been done to oppose Hitler, or, for that matter, the Soviet régime (although, in the latter case, there might have been complaints about the threat to détente). Yet it often seems that it is only when the Communists have won that people realise that they had been on the way to winning.

Russia remains an expansionist power—and its chances for further expansion, given the effects of the oil crisis, the rising strength of the Marxist Left in southern Europe and the prospect of a new phase of American isolationism, are probably greater now than at any time since the immediate post-1945 period. The Americans and their allies are increasingly on the defensive.

The Americans exerted themselves, to a fairly minimal extent, in what was seen as an attempt to prevent Chile becoming a part of the expansionist bloc. There is no doubt that in present conditions, why that should be regarded as a monstrous—or immoral—thing to do.